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Abstract 
 
What happens to goal-relevant information in working memory after it is no longer needed? Here, we 
review evidence for a selective removal process that operates on outdated information to limit working 
memory load and hence facilitates the maintenance of goal-relevant information. Removal alters the 
representations of irrelevant content so as to reduce access to it, thereby improving access to the 
remaining relevant content and also facilitating the encoding of new information. Both behavioral and 
neural evidence support the existence of a removal process that is separate from forgetting due to decay or 
interference. We discuss the potential mechanisms involved in removal and characterize the time course 
and duration of the process. In doing so, we propose the existence of two forms of removal: one is 
temporary, and reversible, which modifies working memory content without impacting content-to-context 
bindings, and another is permanent which unbinds the content from its context in working memory 
(without necessarily impacting long-term forgetting). Finally, we discuss limitations on removal and 
prescribe conditions for evaluating evidence for or against this process.  
 
1. What is removal? 
 
Removal is the exclusion of information from working memory in service of the current goal. It is one of 
several processes that control the contents of working memory and enable an efficient use of its limited 
capacity. Some of these control processes support the maintenance of information in working memory by 
strengthening the information or establishing temporary bindings between items and their context. These 
include rehearsal, consolidation, and attentional refreshing. Other processes control the flow of 
information into working memory (input gating), manipulate and modify information in working memory 
(updating), and select the appropriate items in working memory that need to affect performance (output 
gating). Removal helps support all these major functions. 
This definition of removal has two important implications. First, a necessary condition for 
demonstrating removal is showing that the information was encoded into working memory before 
removal took place, and it is no longer in working memory subsequently. This could be achieved by (but 
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is not limited to) demonstrating a diminished set-size effect 1, or a reduced neural trace 2–4, following a 
retro-cue during a memory delay informing the person that some of their current working-memory 
contents are no longer relevant. A second implication of our definition is that removal is goal-directed, 
namely it is an adaptive process which supports the current task goal. This characteristic is necessary in 
order to exclude forms of maladaptive forgetting, such as time-based decay 5 or interference 6, from our 
definition. Conceptually these processes may co-exist with removal. At the same time, it can be 
challenging to distinguish them empirically, and therefore they could also be invoked as alternatives to 
removal for explaining the same findings. In the final section of this manuscript, we consider 
experimental approaches to differentiate these putatively independent processes. 
Removing information from working memory is necessary to keep working memory up to date 
with our thinking and acting: The contents of our thoughts and our intended actions change at a rapid 
pace, and so does the environment we attend to. Therefore, information once relevant rapidly becomes 
(temporarily) irrelevant and needs to be removed to avoid clutter in working memory 7. In the lab, 
removal is studied in three scenarios. The first is when a subset of the information in working memory is 
marked as relevant for the present goal, as in the case of a retro-cue 8, while the rest of working memory 
contents is marked as irrelevant 5,6,8,9. In this case, removing the irrelevant items from working memory 
reduces the goal-relevant memory load, and thereby enhances the maintenance of the remaining items 
(e.g., by reducing interference)10. A second scenario that calls for removal is the inadvertent encoding of 
irrelevant items into working memory, despite being previously marked as distractors, due to an imperfect 
input selection 11. The situations in which input selection is done proactively (i.e., through selective gating 
12) vs. reactively (through post-encoding removal) still need to be specified, along with the possible 
modulation of these two strategies by individual differences (c.f. Braver et al. 13). A third scenario that 
involves removal is (partial or complete) updating of working memory contents with new information. 
Updating paradigms typically require participants to maintain several items in working memory, each 
related to a specific spatial or temporal position (context), and to update each of them upon demand 14–18. 
Removing outdated associations between items and their context is needed in order to enable the creation 
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of new ones, which also helps to reduce proactive interference from previous items that were associated 
with each contextual cue. Notably, removal can take place in advance, in preparation for updating, even 
before the new information is available 15. This implies that removal is not merely a byproduct of 
substituting old items with newer ones, but a separate process 19 that can take place in a proactive manner. 
Common to all these cases is the need for a removal process to effectively limit the amount of information 
held in working memory, in order to overcome its capacity limitations in the support of flexible, goal-
directed behavior. 
 
2. Evidence for removal 
To evaluate whether removal should be considered a separate and unique process for working memory, or 
whether it may be redundant with other processes, we will review empirical evidence for and against 
removal. Evidence for removal comes in three forms: (1) An improvement of performance in working 
memory tasks after irrelevant information has been removed, (2) Reduced access to the removed 
information, and (3) Reduced neural activity correlated with the removed information. In this section we 
will review each kind of evidence in turn. We will address possible evidence against removal in section 7. 
 
2.1. Removal facilitates access to the remaining contents of working memory 
When part of the current contents of working memory are removed, the load on the limited capacity of 
working memory decreases, and this should lead to faster and more accurate access to the remaining, still 
relevant information. This improvement has been observed in studies in which part of the current memory 
set is cued as irrelevant after encoding. For instance, in the Modified Sternberg paradigm, participants 
encode two subsets of items, distinguished by their color or their location on the screen. Subsequently, 
one of the subsets is cued as relevant and the other as irrelevant for the upcoming recognition test. About 
1s after this cue, the set size of the irrelevant list ceases to affect the reaction time (RT) to the recognition 
probe1,4,20. This effect is reversible: When a subset cued to be irrelevant for a first memory test is 
subsequently cued to be relevant for a second test, people can do the second test without problems, and 
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their RTs for the second test are again affected by the size of the previously irrelevant but now relevant 
subset 20. 
Recent experiments have revealed boundary conditions for removal of subsets from working 
memory: A subset of the current contents of working memory can be removed only if the to-be-
remembered and the to-be-forgotten subsets have already been encoded as two distinct groups; removing 
a subset of items selected at random after encoding is difficult, and perhaps impossible 21. Yet, when a 
single item selected at random from the current memory set is cued to be relevant (inviting removal of all 
other items), access to that item is facilitated, and the number of irrelevant items again ceases to affect 
RTs about 1-2s after the cue 22,23. Moreover, when a single item is cued as relevant within a first memory 
set, it is easier to add a second memory set to working memory afterwards. This observation provides 
evidence that removing all but one item from the first set frees up working memory capacity for the 
second set 23.  
Experiments with a working memory updating paradigm provide further evidence that removal of 
old information facilitates updating. In the updating paradigm 17,24, participants need to update their 
working memory contents over several steps, in which they replace one or several of the current memory 
items by a new stimulus. For instance, they initially encode a list of letters presented across a row of 
frames. During each subsequent updating step, they see a new letter in one or several of the frames to 
replace the letter currently remembered for that frame. If the to-be-updated frames are marked ahead of 
presentation of the new letters, the time participants take for updating working memory (i.e., their RT to 
each new set of letters) is markedly reduced. This time saving is explained by the preemptive removal of 
the old letter in each marked frame from working memory before the new letter appears 14,15. 
 
2.2. Removed contents of working memory become less accessible 
The perhaps most obvious prediction from the assumption that some information is removed from 
working memory is that this information should be less accessible afterwards. Testing this prediction is 
complicated by the fact that, when participants are asked repeatedly to report or process the information 
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they had supposedly removed, they will learn quickly that removing that information from working 
memory may not be necessary, or even worthwhile if the unloading and reloading of working memory 
content is more costly than simply maintaining it. Some experimenters have mitigated that problem by 
inviting participants to drop some information from working memory, and asking them to report that 
information on only a small subset of trials. For instance, Muter 25 had participants work on a random 
mixture of primarily two kinds of tasks: When they saw a letter trigram, followed by the instruction 
"LETTERS", they had to recall the letters. When instead the trigram was followed by a three-digit 
number, they had to count down in threes from that number instead. On about 2% of the trials – towards 
the end of the experiment – the trigram was followed by a three-digit number, inviting removal of the 
trigram, but then the instruction "LETTERS" asked for recall of the trigram. Memory for the trigram in 
these trials was extremely poor already after a retention interval of 2 s 25,26. Williams and colleagues 27 
demonstrated an analogous effect in working memory for visual materials: After encoding an array of two 
colors, one of them was cued to be relevant, and tested on 95% of all trials. On 5% of trials, the other 
color was tested. Memory for the non-cued item was barely better than chance merely 1.5 s after the cue, 
again indicating rapid and thorough erasure of the supposedly irrelevant information from working 
memory. These examples demonstrate instances in which removed information had reduced accessibility, 
even to the point of no accessibility, that is, the information was completely forgotten. Removal from 
working memory has also been linked with longer-term forgetting of that information 28. Not all 
information that is removed is forgotten, however, as shown by experiments in which recently removed 
information can be reloaded into working memory without sacrificing memory performance 2,20.   
Other experiments demonstrate more indirectly that access to removed information is reduced. In 
the working memory updating paradigm, replacing an item by a new item that is identical (or even 
similar) to the old one facilitates updating, as shown by faster updating times 29. This effect suggests that 
encoding of the new stimulus commences partially in parallel with removal of the old, so that the 
representation of the new stimulus in working memory can build on the residual traces of the old one.  
However, when the to-be-updated item is cued beforehand, and enough time is provided between the cue 
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and the replacement stimulus, this facilitating effect is much reduced 14,15.  This is what would be 
expected if, in response to the cue, the participant removed the old item from working memory before 
even seeing the new stimulus, so that the old memory trace could no longer facilitate updating when the 
new stimulus was presented. This situation highlights potential performance costs associated with 
removal: Maintaining irrelevant information in working memory might be preferred if this facilitates its 
eventual replacement with related information, but only if this facilitation outweighs the costs associated 
with not removing that information 30 (e.g., maintenance efforts and the potential for interference with 
relevant information). Evaluating this tradeoff and responding adaptively would likely be challenging for 
participants, and this could be a fruitful avenue of future research. 
The relevance of efficient removal for working memory can be appreciated by looking at 
populations who struggle with disengaging from information in working memory. Clinical research on 
depression has provided evidence that self-reported rumination (i.e., prolonged dwelling on negative 
thoughts) is correlated with difficulties to remove irrelevant information from working memory 31–34, but 
not for people with social anxiety, who also tend to dwell on negative thoughts 32,33.  Understanding the 
underlying mechanisms of removal may lead to more effective and focused interventions. 
 
2.3. Removed contents of working memory become neurally silent 
Recent developments in cognitive neuroscience enable researchers to decode – in a coarse manner – the 
content of representations implemented by ongoing neural activity 35,36. In this way, EEG and fMRI 
signals can be used to monitor which information is represented in a neurally active manner during the 
retention interval of a working memory task. This method has been applied to the Modified Sternberg 
task, in which one of two subsets in working memory is cued as relevant for the upcoming recognition 
probe. Shortly after such a cue, the content of the irrelevant subset can no longer be decoded from neural 
activity. When after the first memory test a second cue indicates that set to be relevant for a second 
memory test, the neural activity pattern correlating with the previously irrelevant, now relevant set comes 
back 2,4,37. These results show that neurally active representations in working memory can be temporarily 
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removed, and this removal is reversible, implying that there must also be a neurally silent representation 
38 that maintains the information in a state that is not decodable from neural activity with current methods 
(c.f. Schneegans and Bayes 39 and Christophel et al. 40 for recent challenges to this interpretation). 
The neurally silent representations can be re-activated intentionally by the participant when they 
are expected to be relevant, but they can also be re-activated by exogenous manipulations of neural 
activity 41,42. Rose and colleagues 41 used the two-test Modified Sternberg task and applied TMS in the 
interval following a retro-cue, during which the currently irrelevant content was not decodable. The TMS 
pulse briefly rendered the irrelevant content decodable again. However, this worked only after the first of 
two successive cues – at a time when the currently irrelevant subset could become relevant again for the 
second test. After the second test – when the now irrelevant subset was known never to become relevant 
again – TMS did not render it decodable again. This finding hints at two different kinds of removal, one 
temporary, and the other permanent. We will address this possible distinction further as we turn our 
discussion now to the likely cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying removal. 
 
Figure 1. Removal from working memory. Diagrams depicting the hypothesized states of working 
memory representations following their temporary removal (left) and permanent removal (right). In both 
scenarios, item A is goal-relevant and inside the focus of attention (golden halo). It is neurally active and 
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bound (black line) to a specific context in working memory (orange disc). Items B and C are irrelevant 
and have been removed. They have become neurally inactive, and their context bindings either remain 
intact (temporary removal) or have been severed (permanent removal). Only temporarily removed items 
can be retrieved and reactivated by refocusing attention on their intact context bindings.  
 
3. The mechanisms of removal 
Removal involves the exclusion of information from working memory in service of the current goal.  We 
propose that this exclusion can be either temporary or permanent depending on whether the information 
might be relevant later 2,20 (Fig. 1). These anticipated demands influence how the removal process unfolds 
in time, and which aspects of the working memory representation it affects. According to many models of 
working memory 43,44, encoding requires a representation of the to-be-remembered information that is 
temporarily bound to a representation of the context in which it was encountered (e.g., the serial position 
in a list, or the spatial position in an array). Removal could therefore operate on any or all three of these 
parts: the content, the context, and the binding between them. Removal from working memory does not 
necessarily imply forgetting of that information from long-term memory (c.f. Williams et al. 27), because 
information removed from working memory can have a separate representation in long-term memory. 
 The evidence reviewed in the previous section about removal leading to the neural ‘silencing’ of 
the active representations of those items, which can be restored if cued as relevant shortly after 2,4,37, 
suggests that temporary removal does not abolish any information from memory, but reversibly alters the 
“state” of this information to improve goal-relevant processing. Specifically, removal may transform 
items from activation-based storage to weight-based (synaptic) storage 45. There are two possible 
interpretations of this transformation. One is that the contents of working memory are outsourced into 
long-term memory (sometimes referred to as “activated long-term memory” 46–48). This idea is supported 
by the observation of limitations that long-term memory imposes on removal from working memory: 
Recent evidence suggests that prior knowledge and familiarity of items in working memory may impede 
the selective updating 49 or removal 50 of those items. 
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Another possibility is that information that is temporarily irrelevant is transferred into an 
unattended and hidden state of representation within working memory, maintained in the brain not by 
active neuronal firing but by short-term plasticity at the synapses of neurons coding for the information 
38,51–53. This hidden state contains items that have been removed from the focus of attention but are still 
“in” working memory 52. This idea coincides with theoretical states of intermediate-term memory outside 
the focus of attention such as the “region of direct access” 54 or “accessory memory” 55 . This information 
can be reactivated into a neurally detectable (and cognitively attended) state through cues that leverage 
intact content-to-context bindings. 
 Temporary removal contrasts with a more permanent form of removal that acts to completely and 
irreversibly remove irrelevant information from working memory. Working memory contents become 
permanently irrelevant when participants learn that the information will never again be needed to support 
task performance. This can occur during working memory updating tasks in which existing items need to 
be modified or replaced 15 and in retro-cueing tasks after the final cue in a given trial identifies that 
information that will no longer be needed 1,9,20. When an item becomes permanently irrelevant, it neurally 
deactivates and no longer casts the same shadow on ongoing maintenance or task performance. That is, 
information that becomes completely irrelevant (and thus a candidate for permanent removal) is no longer 
neurally detectable with exogenous stimulation as is temporarily irrelevant information 41, it is no longer 
behaviorally detectable with attentional biases on visual search tasks 56, and it imposes less strong 
intrusion costs on memory performance as did temporarily removed information 20,57. 
The mechanisms supporting removal from working memory are not yet clear. We propose that 
temporary removal from working memory operates on content representations while sparing the context 
and the content-to-context bindings. One possible mechanism for this is the withdrawal of attention from 
an irrelevant representation in working memory, which leads to a temporary and reversible silencing of its 
neural representation 3,4 and of its influence on concurrent processing 20,56.  Using context cues to retrieve 
this content back into the focus of attention (thereby reinstating its neural and behavioral consequences) 
requires intact content-to-context bindings. 
 Page 11 of 23 
In contrast, we propose that permanent removal operates primarily on the binding between 
content and context, and in some situations, may operate on all three components. Permanent removal 
involves the active unbinding of contents from their contexts in working memory. This is an adaptive 
process that can reduce interference during subsequent encoding. For example, consider a situation in 
which item A (e.g., a word) is bound to context 1 (e.g., serial position 1) in working memory. When A 
becomes task-irrelevant, its activation may dissipate due to the withdrawal of attention (temporary 
removal), but its representation will remain intact and still bound to that context (Fig. 1). If item B is then 
bound to context 1, this will create a situation of cue overload 58 and the attempt to retrieve B (given 
context 1 as a retrieval cue) would be hindered by retrieval competition with A 59. This highlights why 
permanent removal (unbinding an item from its context) can provide additional performance benefit over 
temporary removal. This form of removal is implemented in the SOB-CS model of working memory 60. 
SOB-CS is a model of concurrent maintenance and processing in working memory tasks such as the 
complex-span paradigm 61, in which encoding of memory items alternates with processing of distractors. 
According to SOB-CS, both items and distractors are encoded into working memory through temporary 
bindings of content representations to their contexts, that is, their current serial position in the list. These 
bindings are created through rapid Hebbian association learning. When processing of a distractor is 
finished, it is no longer needed, and therefore removed from working memory by a gradual unbinding 
process. This unbinding process is implemented as a process called Hebbian anti-learning 62, which does 
the opposite of Hebbian learning: It removes, rather than creates, item-context bindings. Note that this is a 
deliberate, goal-directed removal process affecting only goal-irrelevant information. As such, it is 
conceptually distinct from time-based decay that gradually weakens all item-context bindings in working 
memory. We address the challenge of distinguishing experimentally these alternative accounts in the 
concluding section of this article.  
Much research has been devoted to the voluntary or involuntary inhibition of memory 
representations 63,64. How does removal relate to inhibition? Inhibition is the deactivation of 
representations – sometimes below baseline – that makes accessing these representations harder. An 
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important characteristic of inhibition in one prominent theory is that it affects the item itself, not its 
binding to a retrieval cue. Therefore, the effect of inhibition on the retrievability of a memory 
representation is cue-independent 65. As such, inhibition could play a role in temporary removal as a 
mechanism for rapidly silencing currently unneeded neural representations. At the same time, inhibition is 
different from the unbinding mechanism that we envision for permanent removal. 
 
 
4. Attentional engagement during removal  
To date, very little is known about the attentional demands of removal. As discussed above, if sustained 
attention is indeed required to support working memory 66–68, then temporary removal may be a byproduct 
of the withdrawal of attention from the remembered information. Alternative accounts 53,69, however, 
argue against the necessity of sustained attention for working memory retention. According to this view, 
the removal of information would require something in addition to the mere withdrawal of attention. 
Instead, removal might require active unbinding of items from their context in working memory, as we 
have suggested may underlie the permanent form of removal. Such a process could be implemented 
through Hebbian anti-learning, which requires an active representation of the content and the context 
whose binding needs to be untied 60. Therefore, removal of content-context bindings would arguably 
entail attentional focus towards (not away from) the to-be-removed item and its context. To date, there is 
no evidence that removal involves attending to the to-be-removed information.  
Another question related to the role of attention in removal is whether the removal process 
requires central attentional capacity, sometimes referred to as a central bottleneck. The assumption that 
removal requires central attention is supported by evidence showing that directed forgetting of an item 
involves an attention-demanding removal process 70–72. One attempt to test whether removal of irrelevant 
information from working memory relies on the central bottleneck resulted in ambiguous evidence 11. We 
conclude that the available evidence is insufficient to determine whether or not removal relies on central 
attention.  
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5. The time course of removal 
Early experiments on removal of irrelevant information from working memory pointed to a gradual 
removal process that takes about 1-2s to completely remove a set of three items 1. This time course was 
corroborated by a study tracking the EEG correlate of the to-be-removed information over time 4. A 
gradual removal process at about this rate is also assumed in the SOB-CS model 60.  The assumption of 
gradual removal of distractors over about 1-2s explains why memory performance in complex-span tasks 
improves with increasing free time following each distractor 73, although a recent complex-span study 
suggests that distractor removal might be much slower than assumed in SOB-CS so far 74. 
More recent experiments point to different time courses of removal under different conditions 21. 
In these experiments, participants initially encoded six words, of which three were subsequently cued to 
be irrelevant. Memory was tested by a recognition probe, to be compared to one specific word in the 
remaining relevant subset. The effectiveness of removing the irrelevant words was measured by 
comparing recognition RTs and accuracies in the removal condition to two baselines, one in which all six 
words had to be remembered, and one in which only three words were encoded and remembered. When 
the cue identifying the relevant words was presented after encoding of the entire list, recognition RTs (but 
not accuracies) in the removal condition gradually approached those in the set-size 3 baseline as the 
interval between cue and probe increased from 0.1 to 1.5 s. This finding suggests that the irrelevant subset 
was removed from working memory gradually, in line with Oberauer 1. In contrast, when presentation of 
each word was immediately followed by a cue telling the participant whether or not to remember it, RTs 
and accuracies in the removal condition were equivalent to the set-size 3 baseline regardless of the post-
cue time, as if the to-be-forgotten words had never existed. Yet, these words must have been encoded into 
memory at least briefly because the forget cues were fully effective even when presented 1 s after offset 
of the preceding word. This brief maintenance is presumably accomplished by working memory (c.f. 
Kessler 75 for an alternative explanation involving direct encoding into long-term memory). If the 
individual words are initially maintained in working memory, it follows that they can be removed very 
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rapidly and effectively from working memory right after encoding, before any further processes 
intervene. This conclusion is also corroborated by a separate set of experiments using a similar paradigm 
76. Very fast removal of a just-encoded representation challenges the SOB-CS model, because it would 
imply that each distractor representation can be removed from working memory very rapidly once it is no 
longer needed for the processing task. If that is the case, slow and gradual removal of distractors cannot 
explain the beneficial effect of longer free time in between distractors. 
The two observed time courses of removal suggest two kinds of removal, reminiscent of the 
distinction between item-wise and list-wise directed forgetting in the long-term memory literature 77. 
Item-wise removal, applied right after encoding of a stimulus, is very fast and improves both speed and 
accuracy of access to the remaining contents of working memory. In contrast, subset-wise removal, 
applied to one of several subsets after encoding the entire memory set, is slower, taking about 1-2 s, and 
primarily improves speed of access to the remaining working memory contents. One possible explanation 
of these different time courses is in terms of the distinction proposed in Section 3: temporary vs. 
permanent removal. Item-wise removal, immediately after encoding a stimulus, reflects the complete and 
permanent removal of the new working memory content, including its temporary bindings to its context, 
as implemented in SOB-CS. In contrast, subset-wise removal consists of the – potentially temporary – 
cessation of persistent neural activation of content representations 2–4, leaving content-context bindings 
intact. Subset-wise removal of content-context bindings may be possible, but difficult after several other 
processes have intervened between encoding and removal (see the next section, and Oberauer 21).  
 
6. Limitations on removal 
Under some circumstances, removal is a slow and perhaps laborious process, suggesting that it is not 
efficiently applied in all situations. Here we discuss under which circumstances, and why, removal is 
limited. The effectiveness of (permanent) removal of item-context bindings is limited by its prerequisites: 
To remove the item-context bindings of one or several items within a memory set, these bindings must 
first be selectively accessed. This can be difficult, sometimes so difficult that removal does not take place 
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at all. The first evidence for this difficulty comes from a study by Ecker and colleagues 15. They used a 
working memory updating paradigm in which the to-be-updated subset of the items was pre-cued in each 
trial prior to the presentation of the new items, enabling the participants to remove the outdated items in 
advance. Indeed, when one item (out of a set of three) was pre-cued for removal, updating times were 
faster when the new items were presented. Preemptive removal of the old item produced an encoding 
benefit for the new one. This benefit, however, did not scale with the number of items pre-cued for 
removal: The updating times were not any faster when two (of the three) items were cued. This suggests 
some form of partial removal: Either both cued items were each only partially removed before the new 
items appeared, or only one of the two cued items was selected and fully removed. A possible reason for 
the removal of only one of two items is the time consuming nature of serially scanning throughout the list 
and switching between removed and maintained items 18,78. Performance was the fastest when the entire 
current memory set was updated (see also Kessler and Meiran 17). In this condition, little benefit for pre-
cuing was observed, suggesting that removing the entire set is not done sequentially, item by item, but 
rather in a rapid “wipe out” manner. 
Another series of experiments also revealed circumstances under which removal is difficult 21.  
Participants were asked to encode six words into working memory and then three of them were indicated 
to be irrelevant, and thus could be removed. When the three to-be-removed words were selected at 
random, people did not remove them at all. Only when the words formed an already pre-defined subset at 
encoding was there any evidence for removal. Removal of a random subset of three out of six items might 
be forbiddingly difficult for the same reasons as those identified with the updating task: Participants 
would have to scan the entire set of six words, switching back and forth between maintenance and 
removal, and this might be too time-consuming or challenging to allow for efficient removal.  
 In additional to the above time constraints, the strength of removal is also limited in its precision. 
A perfect removal process would completely remove items from working memory, without leaving 
residues and without over-suppressing them. However, evidence for both types of imperfect removal 
strength are available. For example, recent neural evidence suggests that cueing the relevant dimension 
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(e.g., phonological, semantic, or visual) of a single item in working memory results in a biasing 79 of 
neural representation towards the relevant dimension while representations of the irrelevant dimensions 
are reduced but not completely removed 50. Behaviorally, item-position repetition benefits are observed in 
the working memory updating paradigm (80; see also Lendínez et al. 29 for a generalization to semantic 
similarity). This benefit is reduced, but not eliminated, following a removal-cue 14, showing that removal 
was incomplete. Based on neural readouts from fMRI data, removal success can be highly variable from 
trial to trial, and incomplete removal of irrelevant items has even been linked to the subsequent forgetting 
of those items (vs. items that were completely removed) in recognition tests of long-term memory 81.  
Conversely, evidence for excess removal comes from repetition costs that have been observed 
using the reference-back paradigm 82. Kessler 75 recently demonstrated n-2 repetition costs (“backward 
inhibition” 83) within a series of working-memory updating steps, but not within a series of trials that did 
not involve updating. Such costs are typically observed in the task switching domain (c.f. Gade et al. 84 
for a demonstration in declarative working memory). They provide evidence for an “overshoot” of 
removal. Namely, changing the item that is associated with a specific context (e.g., location) from item A 
to B involves removal of the binding between A and that context. When the effect of removal lingers 
during the following trials, associating A again in that context is harder, and hence takes more time, than 
associating another item. The finding of n-2 repetition costs in working memory updating, implicating 
overly strong removal, is the opposite of the above evidence for a reduced (but not abolished) repetition 
gain following a removal cue. Notably, in Kessler’s experiments only one item had to be stored in 
working memory, while Ecker et al.’s 14 study required the storage of three items. Paradoxically, the 
single-item context might be conceived as harder due to a higher cue overload compared to the 3-item 
context, leading participants to apply removal more strongly in that context (see Jost et al. 85 for an 
analogous example of variable inhibition in task-switching). Further empirical work is required to 
examine this idea. 
 
7. What counts as evidence against removal? 
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In Section 2, we reviewed evidence that (1) removal facilitates processing of the remaining contents of 
working memory, and that (2) the removed contents become less accessible, and (3) neurally silent. Now 
we consider two kinds of evidence against removal. First, any evidence that supports an alternative 
explanation of these three kinds of findings strengthens the case against removal. Second, failure to find 
these three effects when removal is predicted to happen also counts as evidence against removal. 
One potential alternative explanation of the empirical signatures of removal is time-based decay, 
together with selective maintenance of the relevant information (e.g., through rehearsal). For this 
explanation to work, decay would have to occur very rapidly, eliminating working memory 
representations within 1 to 2 s, or even faster (see Section 5). This is an unlikely assumption, in particular 
for verbal materials, for which the balance of evidence implies that they don't decay at all 86,87 (but see 
Ricker et al. 88 for a different view). One way to adjudicate between decay and removal is to combine a 
short-term directed-forgetting paradigm 89 with a secondary task that impedes rehearsal and refreshing. 
For instance, after reading a short list of words, participants might receive a "remember" or "forget" cue, 
followed by a brief period that is either unfilled or filled with a secondary task. After that, a second list of 
words is encoded that always needs to be remembered. The decay assumption predicts a beneficial effect 
of the secondary task in the "remember" condition: Preventing rehearsal should allow more decay, 
resulting in a reduced load on working memory from the first list. As a consequence, memory for the 
second list should be better. Conversely, the removal assumption predicts a detrimental effect of the 
secondary task in the "forget" condition: Preventing removal should leave a larger load on working 
memory from the first list, and thereby lead to worse memory for the second list.   
A variant of this alternative explanation that does not require decay states that, rather than 
removing irrelevant information, the working memory system strengthens relevant information. As a 
consequence, the irrelevant information, although still in working memory, becomes less accessible due 
to the much stronger competition from relevant information. This explanation faces empirical and 
conceptual problems. Empirically, it does not agree with the finding that the decodability of irrelevant 
information from neural signals drops to baseline 2,4,41.  It also cannot account for evidence of successful 
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directed forgetting in the absence of any to-be-remembered information in working memory 90, and it 
cannot explain why, after cueing all but one item of a first memory set as irrelevant, a subsequently 
encoded second memory set is remembered better 23. This should not happen in a limited-capacity 
memory system if all that happens in response to a cue is strengthening of the cued item. Conceptually, 
this explanation implies that with every shift of relevance the overall strength of memory traces in 
working memory increases. Moreover, every new content encoded into working memory – for instance, 
in an updating task – adds further memory traces that must have more strength than the previous ones 
they are to replace. Over a lifetime this would increase the strength of working memory representations to 
dizzying heights. 
Another approach to find evidence against removal could be to demonstrate that, after an 
opportunity to remove irrelevant material from working memory, accessibility of that material is 
undiminished. For this test to be informative, care must be taken that the test of accessibility actually 
measures the information that is assumed to be removed. A recent study by Dagry and Barrouillet 91 
illustrates the potential problems in this endeavor. These authors set out to test the assumption in the 
SOB-CS model 60 that, in a complex-span task 61, memory traces of distractors are removed from working 
memory. In SOB-CS, distractors are inadvertently encoded by binding them to the list positions of 
adjacent memory items, and they are removed from working memory by unbinding them from these list 
positions. The prediction to be tested, therefore, is that distractor-position bindings are less accessible 
after an opportunity to remove them. This could be accomplished, for instance, by asking participants 
(perhaps on a tiny subset of trials, as in Muter 25) to recall the distractors in serial order, or to recall the 
distractors following a given memory item. Dagry and Barrouillet 91, however, tested memory for 
distractors independent of their bindings to list positions, through a free-recall test, and through short-
term repetition priming. Both forms of memory test gauge the strength of some form of memory about the 
recent occurrence of the distractor stimuli, not about their bindings to specific list positions. On the 
assumption that short-term repetition priming 92 reflects the strength of persistent neural activation of a 
recently processed stimulus, the strength of short-term repetition priming could be used to gauge the 
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(temporary) removal of content representations - but not the (permanent) removal of content-context 
bindings.  
 
Summary 
We reviewed evidence for removal as a distinct control process that excludes irrelevant information from 
working memory in service of goal-directed behavior. Removal can be temporary, operating only on the 
contents of working memory without impacting content-context bindings necessary for reversing this 
process. Or it can be permanent, wiping out the content and contextual bindings of outdated information. 
Removal can be proactive to facilitate new encoding, and it can be reactive to improve access to subsets 
of relevant information already in working memory. The speed of removal depends on whether an item or 
a subset of items is being removed, ranging from a very fast and effortless (permanent) removal of a just-
encoded item, to a more gradual, laborious (temporary) removal of a subset of items. The process may be 
applied too weakly, leading to partial removal, or too strongly leading to lingering inhibition, both of 
which can impose behavioral costs. The mechanisms supporting removal are currently underspecified, 
and this review is meant to motivate future research on key unresolved issues that will help us understand 
how the brain reduces, reuses, and recycles information.   
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